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DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Boston. The careers of these 82o delinquents were followed until they
were all two or more years above the juvenile age. It is interesting to
note that fifty per cent of the Chicago cases had adult court records as
compared with only 21 per cent of the Boston series.
Still more important is the fact that of the Chicago failures, 14 com-
mitted homicide, whereas there were no homicides in the Boston series.
Furthermore, Chicago's failures showed 39 professional criminals as con-
trasted with one professional criminal in the Boston group. The dissimi-
larities in outcomes of these two delinquent groups are not explained by
differences in human material, but rather in the differences in methods of
approach and treatment. In these latter respects the two cities were far
apart at the time of the study.
One is likely to wonder whether the large percentage of failures among
the Chicago delinquents was not due to the fact that these cases were more
serious. In so far as this is true it is a reflection upon the methods of
handling pre-delinquents and semi-delinquents in Chicago, as compared with
Boston.
We have for the first time in this field, an array of factual data based
upon years of practical and scientific investigation. The material is well
organized. The explanations are clear and free from bias.
JAMES M. REINHAROT,
Assistant Professor of Sociology,
University of North Dakota.
RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE: LEON GREEN. Vernon Law Book Com-
pany. Kansas City, Mo. 1927, pp. 216, viii.
This book purports to be an analysis of the various factors which have
made proximate cause a puzzling conception for lawyers and judges. There
are several things to recommend the volume. In the first place it is written
in a clear, incisive style-almost laconic in places. In the next place,
it is an unusually keen sifting out of the meat of a large number of cases
where legal cause is obscured behind a welter of learned nonsense. The
writer takes the position that in many so-called "proximate cause" cases,
the real issue is simply one of policy, involving the finding of a practical,
workable rule derived from a weighing of interests, which, if recognized as
the real issue, would result in at least intelligible decisions which, when un-
sound, could be subsequently modified or corrected with a minimum of dis-
turbance to the legal order. This, indeed, is far more than can be said
for many judical disquisitions on proximate cause..
The most convincing part of the author's argument consists of the
many cases which he cites and discusses on the basis of their factual con-
tents. This it is that makes the book useful to teachers and students as well
as practitioners and judges.
Many cases clearly indicate how courts have mistaken negligence
questions for proximate cause problems, and how frequently the test for
negligence is employed to work out a problem in causation which in fact
never existed.
Far more serious is the common mistake of assuming a proximate cause
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problem when the real one is to determine whether the plaintiff's interest
which has been violated is one for the protection of which there is a rule
of law available. The result here, of course, is to throw upon juries the
most delicate of all legal problems, those which have at their basis the
broadest considerations of public policy and evaluation of interests.
And it is thus that this analysis emphasizes the legislative phases of
the judicial process. One may be inclined to question certain steps in the
author's analytical process, but one cannot deny that he has rendered a
great service in eliminating formulae which are too frequently employed to
either hide the legislative activities of courts or to shunt them off to less
responsible agencies. When we have law made, the law-makers should know
that they are making it, and should realize the high importance of their
calling.
Incidentally, the result of this analysis, if properly employed, should
tend to remove the law of torts from the field of speculation for the am-
bulance chaser, and should render it a proper subject for the application of
a more accurate and more predictable legal science.
Most of the important literature on the subject has been treated or
referred to by the author. Some important contributions, however, have
unfortunately been neglected.
FOWLER V. HARPER,
Associate Professor of Law,
University of North Dakota.
